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I. INTRODUCTION
In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks,
radio station owners faced a difficult decision: Should the station limit its
play list to reflect the nation’s period of turmoil? In the weeks to follow,
there undoubtedly would be a careful revision of many radio stations’
musical choices—sometimes deliberately, sometimes unconsciously. Most
of these efforts drew little attention.
One station owner’s actions, however, drew sharp criticism from
media watchdogs. In the week following the terrorist attacks, an e-mail
rumor began that Clear Channel Communications had developed a list of
approximately 150 potentially inappropriate songs, which was circulated
among its staff in an attempt temporarily to “ban” the songs from its play
lists.1 Clear Channel’s official statement is that no songs were ever
“banned,” and that the company simply suggested in an internal memo that
its staff members be sensitive to their audience’s mood during a time of
national mourning.2
Even if the memo was simply a suggestion to tastefully limit play
lists, there were several reasons for the outcry. Primarily, critics questioned
whether some of the alleged songs on the list were truly “lyrically
inappropriate,” including John Lennon’s “Imagine” and the Bangles’
“Walk Like an Egyptian.”3 Underlying this criticism, however, was the fact
that Clear Channel is a media conglomerate that owns approximately one
out of every ten U.S. radio stations and has more than 110 million
listeners.4 Whether the list was misguided and the circumstances extreme,
listeners ultimately became angry that Clear Channel had the ability to
manipulate the entire nation’s listening habits with a carefully worded fax.

1. Douglas Wolk, And the Banned Play On, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 26, 2001, at 60,
available at http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0139/wolk.php.
2. Steve Jones, No. 1 Radio Chain Didn’t Ban Songs, USA TODAY, Sept. 19, 2001, at
4D, available at http://www.usatoday.com/life/music/2001-09-20-song-list.htm#more; see
also Press Release, Clear Channel Communications, Clear Channel Says National “Banned
Playlist” Does Not Exist (Sept. 18, 2001), available at http://www.clearchannel.com/
documents/press_releases/NationalBannedPlaylist.pdf.
3. Eliza Truitt, It’s the End of the World as Clear Channel Knows It, SLATE, Sept. 17,
2001, at http://slate.msn.com/?id=1008314.
4. Clear Channel Communications Web site, at http://www.clearchannel.com/
radio/index.php (last visited Nov. 21, 2002).
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“Mega-owners” such as Clear Channel became possible with the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act),5 which radically deregulated
national and local radio station ownership limits that had been in existence
for almost sixty years.6 The 1996 Act reflected Congress’s firm belief that a
deregulated marketplace would best serve the public interest, as suggested
by the Act’s preface, which described its purpose as: “[t]o promote
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and
higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and
encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications
technologies.”7
This Note argues that the 1996 Act is an example of excessive
adherence to the marketplace model, particularly for regulating the radio
industry. From the time that the Federal Communication Commission
(“FCC” or “Commission”) was created until the early 1980s, the
Commission regulated radio based on the trusteeship model, “whereby
broadcast stations were entrusted by the government to operate in the
public interest” based upon specific guidelines.8 This changed in 1981,
when the Commission began to deregulate the industry and implemented a
marketplace model, under which the market would determine the public
interest.9 Although a less extreme marketplace model has guided the FCC’s
regulation of radio since the early 1980s, the current incarnation of the
marketplace model is both contrary to the public interest and economically
harmful for radio stations and industries affected by radio, such as
advertising. Part II of this Note describes the theoretical bases and history
of radio station ownership regulation, including the trusteeship model and
the marketplace model of regulation. Part III of this Note describes the
marketplace model’s negative effect on diversity of ownership in the radio
industry. Part IV gives an analysis of these effects, linking decreased
diversity of station ownership with harm to the public interest.

5. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
6. Implementation of Sections 202(a) and 202(b)(1) of the Telecomms. Act of 1996
(Brdcst. Radio Ownership), Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 12368, paras. 2-3, 2 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
376 (1996).
7. 110 Stat. at 56.
8. Benjamin J. Bates & Todd Chambers, The Economic Basis for Radio Deregulation,
12 J. MEDIA ECON. 19, 22 (1999).
9. Id. at 23.
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II. HISTORY OF OWNERSHIP REGULATION OF RADIO STATIONS
BEFORE AND AFTER THE 1996 TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT
To understand the magnitude of the changes that the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 has wrought on the radio industry, it is
important to track the changes in radio regulation since it was first
regulated in the early twentieth century. First, this Note will examine the
policy justifications behind radio regulation; then, it will examine the
regulations themselves, including limitations on local ownership, national
ownership, and the concurrent ownership of radio stations and other media
such as newspapers or television stations.

A.

Policy Justifications

Radio is unique in that it is the first broadcast medium that the federal
government controlled by regulations.10 Radio regulation was first based on
the proposition that airwaves were a public resource that was exploited for
the “public interest” by those granted the “privilege” by the federal
government.11 However, over the past twenty years, the concept of the
“public interest” has become malleable, changing from a trusteeship model
in the 1930s to today’s marketplace model.12 The most recent radio
regulatory legislation, the 1996 Act, is yet another extension of that
marketplace model, but much more far-reaching. To understand the
detrimental effects of the 1996 Act’s deregulatory scheme, it is important
to review the trusteeship model under which the courts and the FCC
worked for the first fifty years of the Commission’s existence.

1.

The Early Years and the Trusteeship Model

The first radio regulations were promulgated in the early 1900s to
prevent overlapping frequencies and signal confusion at a time when radio
was used primarily as a safety device.13 The Radio Act of 1912 gave the
Secretary of Commerce the right to resolve such signal disputes by
licensing; however, a decade later, the ineffectiveness of this Act was
apparent.14 The burden of overseeing radio licensing had become too much

10. Richard R. Zaragoza et al., The Public Interest Concept Transformed: The
Trusteeship Model Gives Way to a Marketplace Approach, in PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE
BUSINESS OF BROADCASTING 27 (Jon T. Powell & Wally Gair eds., 1988).
11. Id. at 28.
12. Id. at 30.
13. Michael Ortner, Current Public Law and Policy Issues: Serving a Different
Master—The Decline of Diversity and the Public Interest in American Radio in the Wake of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 139, 140-141 (2000).
14. Id. at 141.
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for the Commerce Department, and many unlicensed commercial radio
stations began to appear.15 In addition, several court cases
successfullychallenged the right of the Secretary to become involved in
radio regulation.16
In 1927, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover called several
national conferences aimed at managing this situation; these conferences
resulted in the Radio Act of 1927 (1927 Act)17, and the creation of the
National Radio Commission.18 This Commission had the power “to
regulate all public and private radio transmissions,” including granting
licenses and setting hours and frequencies.19 For the first time, the 1927 Act
maintained the public’s rights over those of broadcasters by declaring that
the broadcasters serve “public convenience, interest, or necessity.”20 Seven
years later, the Communications Act of 1934 (1934 Act)21 merged the
Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Radio Commission to
create the Federal Communications Commission.22 The industry-supported
1934 Act was designed to “preserve the developing broadcasting industry
and protect the interests of existing stations.”23 Congress passed the 1934
Act under the assumption that the radio spectrum would stay primarily
commercial; in fact, the 1934 Act stipulated “that the broadcasting industry
would not be a governmental operation.”24 The 1934 Act, however, did
contain some limitations on the ownership and transfer of broadcast
licenses.25 The 1934 Act explained the need for regulation of a privately
owned commercial resource by redefining the airwaves as a scarce public
resource; as such, this public resource required oversight.26 “A second,
largely unstated basis for regulation was fear of the potential power of

15. Id.
16. Id. at 141 n.11. One of these decisions was United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12
F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926). Ortner writes that the Zenith court “ruled that the Secretary of
Commerce did not have the statutory power to assign wavelengths and hours of operation to
radio broadcast license-holders.” Id.
17. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
18. Ortner, supra note 13, at 141, 142.
19. Id. at 142.
20. Id. (citing Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, 1166) (“The licensing
authority, if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby, subject to the
limitation of this Act, shall grant to any applicant therefor [sic] a station license provided for
by this Act.”).
21. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064.
22. Ortner, supra note 13, at 144.
23. Bates & Chambers, supra note 8, at 22.
24. Id.
25. Ortner, supra note 13, at 144.
26. Bates & Chambers, supra note 8, at 22.
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broadcasters, both in terms of political power and economic power.”27 The
FCC’s regulation of a public resource (the airwaves) being used by private
individuals was touted as the “trusteeship” model, whereby the government
entrusted broadcasters with the airwaves to use in a manner consistent with
the public interest.28
Originally, regulators had difficulty defining the “public interest”
under the trusteeship model. In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
the Supreme Court attempted to define the public interest in accordance
with the 1934 Act as “the interest of the listening public in ‘the larger and
more effective use of radio.’”29 However, in FCC v. RCA Communications,
Inc., the Court altered its previous opinion and accepted the FCC’s power
to define the “public interest” on a case-by-case basis.30 Although the
“public interest” was ill-defined by case law, the FCC developed a number
of content and structural regulations to ensure that broadcasters acted
according to the public interest standard.31 Content regulations included
requirements that stations devote a certain amount of broadcast time to
nonentertainment programming, as well as “community ascertainment”
rules that “required broadcasters to familiarize themselves with the needs
and interests of their communities.”32 Structural regulations included
limiting the number of stations a single entity could own, preferring to
license those having fewer broadcast interests, and encouraging minority
participation in broadcasting.33 As discussed infra, first the content
regulations then the structural regulations were eliminated under the
marketplace model.
The Commission received support for its efforts to structurally
regulate broadcasting in FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc.,34 when the
Court clearly stated that marketplace competition is not sufficient to
maintain the public interest:

27. Id. (citation omitted).
28. Id.
29. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (citation omitted). See also Bates
& Chambers, supra note 8, at 22.
30. Bates & Chambers, supra note 8, at 22; FCC v. RCA Comm., Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 9091 (1953).
31. Review of the Comm’n’s Regs. Governing TV Brdcst., Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 10 F.C.C.R. 3524, para. 57, 17 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 2005 (1995) [hereinafter
Television Broadcasting Review].
32. Id. para. 58. These rules were constitutionally problematic in that they placed the
FCC in the difficult position of “assess[ing] licensee responsiveness to community needs”
without violating the First Amendment. Zaragoza et al., supra note 10, at 29.
33. Television Broadcasting Review, supra note 31, at para. 60.
34. 346 U.S. at 93-94.
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[A]s to the industry before us in this case, there has been serious
qualification of competition as the regulating mechanism. The very
fact that Congress has seen fit to enter into the comprehensive
regulation of communications embodied in the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 contradicts the notion that national
policy unqualifiedly favors competition in communications. . . . Of
course, the fact that there is substantial regulation does not preclude
the regulatory agency from drawing on competition for complementary
or auxiliary support. Satisfactory accommodation of the peculiarities of
individual industries to the demands of the public interest necessarily
requires in each case a blend of private forces and public
intervention.35

Thus, the trusteeship model did not equate the “public interest” with
economic competition. In this case, the FCC was to grant licenses only if
there was a “reasonable expectation that competition may have some
beneficial effect” such as “maintaining good service and improving it.”36
Economic efficiency could only factor into the equation as a supporting
force, not a guiding principal.37

2.

The Marketplace Model

The trusteeship model, which used both direct content regulations and
indirect structural regulations to maintain radio’s public interest mandate,
was the primary framework for broadcast regulation until the early 1980s,
when it was replaced with the marketplace model.38
Beginning in the late 1970s, the Commission started proposing a shift
away from the trusteeship model for radio regulation,39 and began using an
economic/marketplace model for broadcast regulation in 1981.40 The
marketplace model did not replace the public interest standard; rather, it
attempted to meet the public interest standard through market forces.41
Under this model, licensees are “marketplace participants,” rather than the
holders of a public trust, and “market forces rather than [FCC] judgments
35. Id.
36. Id. at 97.
37. Id. at 93 n.4:
We need not in this case attempt to suggest with any precision where the balance
is struck. Certainly the presence of §§ 313 and 314 in the Act, prohibiting certain
restrictions on competition, indicates the relevance of some competitive criteria,
although it hardly directs the Commission to rely on “competition.”
38. Zaragoza et al., supra note 10, at 30; Bates & Chambers, supra note 8, at 22-23.
39. Bates & Chambers, supra note 8, at 19-20.
40. Id. at 23. The FCC, however, did not state that it was relying purely on the
economic/marketplace model at the time. Deregulation of Radio (Part 1 of 2), Report and
Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, App. D, para. 1, 49 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1 (1981) [hereinafter
Deregulation of Radio].
41. Deregulation of Radio, supra note 40, para. 3.
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on program service . . . determine where the public interest lies in
broadcasting.”42 Furthermore, the marketplace model finds scarcity of
spectrum space “irrelevant” to the First Amendment analysis of
broadcasting.43 This is because “[b]y definition, all resources are scarce;”44
in essence, the radio spectrum is no different from the limited amount of
newsprint that can be manufactured for the printing of newspapers.45
Under the marketplace model, radio stations still have a public
interest mandate. The model, however, assumes that broadcasters will
inherently act in the public interest by adjusting their content to satisfy their
audience’s preferences.46 A broadcaster that does not satisfy consumer
needs will lose profits.47 Content regulation is not only useless under the
marketplace model, it is actually harmful because any regulatory
interference from the FCC based on content guidelines would “deny the
American consumer maximum satisfaction from the medium.”48
Accordingly, the FCC dropped much of its direct regulation of
programming content.49
During the shift from the trusteeship model to the marketplace model,
traditional liberals and market-oriented conservatives vigorously offered
arguments for and against the new paradigm.50 Liberals argued that
marketplace forces would not adequately protect the public interest,
primarily because there was still ownership monopoly over the spectrum.51
Conservatives and libertarians argued that there was an excess of spectrum,
and that the primary concern should be to develop it; furthermore, new
media options—such as videocassettes and cable—were offering
consumers further entertainment and information options.52 Thus, the
42. Zaragoza et al., supra note 10, at 30 (quoting Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner,
A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 209, 233 (1982)).
43. Id. “Admittedly, there are not unlimited broadcast outlets. But that kind of
‘economic scarcity’ does not justify content regulation.” Id. at 45 n.43 (citing FCC
Chairman Mark S. Fowler’s Testimony before the Subcommittee on Communications,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on March 18, 1987).
44. Bates & Chambers, supra note 8, at 24.
45. Amendment of Section 73.35555 [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636] of
the Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and TV Brdcst. Stations,
Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, para. 7, 56 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 859 (1984).
46. Zaragoza et al., supra note 10, at 30.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, para. 9, 49 Rad. Reg.2d
(P & F) 1 (1981) (proceeding terminated); Zaragoza et al., supra note 10, at 31.
50. Patricia Aufderheide, Shifting Policy Paradigms and the Public Interest in the U.S.
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 2 COMM. REV. 259, 263 (1997).
51. Id.
52. Id.
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public interest in programming diversity was being adequately served by
new technology.53 However, the theory that more entertainment outlets
would result in programming diversity was premised on the fact that station
ownership within markets would remain regulated to prevent local
monopolies.54
Marketplace forces eventually won the battle, and the trusteeship
model’s regulation of broadcast content unraveled under the new
marketplace model. As Mark Fowler, FCC Chairman at the time, noted,
“the language of the [F]irst [A]mendment protects the right of speech, not
the right of access to ideas or even the right to listen. The direct concern of
the [F]irst [A]mendment is with the active speaker, not the passive
receiver.”55 One of the clearest indications of the government’s shift to a
marketplace model, at least before the passage of the 1996 Act, was the
abolition of the “fairness doctrine.” Under this doctrine, broadcasters had a
duty to “afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting
views on issues of public importance.”56
The 1996 Act’s most important provisions (as applied to radio) deal
with the structural regulations still left from the trusteeship model, rather
than content regulation, which had been effectively eliminated by the time
of its passage. Although the elimination of structural regulations may seem
to be the next logical step in moving fully to the marketplace model, it is
unclear that the new legislation has proved itself to be in the public interest
or effective in achieving the stated goal of the 1996 Act: cheaper, betterquality radio media for American “consumers.”57

B.

Regulation History

Before 1996, the FCC mandated three types of structural limits on
radio station ownership: multiple station ownership in the same market;
multiple station ownership nationally; and ownership of both a radio and
television station in the same market, or the “one-to-a-market” rule.58 The
53. Id. At the FCC’s inception in 1934, the nation had 583 radio stations; by 1981, the
number of stations had grown to almost 9000. Deregulation of Radio, supra note 40,
para. 2.
54. Bates & Chambers, supra note 8, at 24.
55. Zaragoza et al., supra note 10, at 45 n.40 (citing Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L.
Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 237-38
(1982)).
56. Id. at 33 (citing Pub. L. No. 66-274, Sec. 1, 73 Stat. 557, amending 47 U.S.C. §
315(a) (1934)). The fairness doctrine was effectively abolished by Complaint of Syracuse
Peace Council, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 63 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F)
541 (1987).
57. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
58. Jill Howard, Congress Errs in Deregulating Broadcast Ownership Caps: More
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1996 Act required significant deregulation in each area, resulting in more
opportunities for the ownership of multiple radio stations by a single entity.

1.

Multiple-Station Ownership in the Same Market

The FCC has regulated ownership of two or more radio stations in a
single market, also known as a duopoly, for more than sixty years. In 1938,
the Commission issued its first decision denying a license that would result
in a duopoly.59 In a strongly worded statement, the Commission declared:
[T]o permit the entry into the field of [a duopoly] might well, from an
economic standpoint, prevent the future entry into the field by an
applicant who would offer a new, different, improved and competitive
service. . . . [T]he Commission will grant duplicate facilities to
substantially identical interests only in cases where it overwhelmingly
appears that the facility, apart from any benefit to the business interests
of the applicant, is for the benefit of the community, fulfilling a need
which cannot otherwise be fulfilled.60

This “diversification of service” rationale indicates that the Commission
believed a greater number of owners in any one area would result in a
greater diversification of programming.61 In 1940, the FCC formally
banned duopolies in FM radio; and in 1943, it did the same for AM radio.62
The duopoly rule has remained constant for many years, even during
the mid-1980s when the Commission began to liberalize national
ownership restrictions.63 However, the Commission loosened the duopoly
rule in 1992,64 citing an explosion of radio stations in most markets, as well
as economic woes that made it imperative for radio stations to share
resources such as “facilities, managerial and clerical staffs, sales,
bookkeeping, promotion, production, news and other aspects of station

Monopolies, Less Localism, Decreased Diversity and Violations of Equal Protection, 5
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 269, 270 (1997).
59. Television Broadcasting Review, supra note 31, para. 4 (citing Genesee Radio
Corp., Order, 5 F.C.C. 183 (1938)).
60. Genesee Radio Corp., Order, 5 F.C.C. 183, 186-87 (1938).
61. Television Broadcasting Review, supra note 31, para. 4.
62. Id.
63. Howard, supra note 58, at 273. However, while duopolies were generally banned
between 1938 and 1992, the definition of a duopoly changed during this period. Between
1943 and 1964, there was no fixed technological definition of a duopoly; rather, each
potential duopoly was evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 273 n.48. In 1964, the FCC
changed its definition of a duopoly so that a single entity could not own two stations with
overlapping 1 mV/m contours. Id. The FCC further modified the standard in 1989, when it
barred a single entity from owning two AM stations or two FM stations with overlapping
contours of 5 mV/m and 3.16 mV/m, respectively. Id.
64. Television Broadcasting Review, supra note 31, para. 4.
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operation.”65 At that time, the FCC was looking for a solution to an
increasingly fragmented radio market with revenue growth that had
dropped to one-tenth the annual growth rate of the Gross National Product
from 1985 to 1990.66 Furthermore, there was evidence that stations in
smaller markets were “highly leveraged in anticipation of increased
profits;” in addition, stations were cutting their staffs, which challenged
their ability to produce news programming.67 The FCC concluded from this
evidence that “radio stations could not meet their public interest mandate if
they could not make a profit.”68 Approving a limited number of duopolies
in certain markets would allow stations to combine operations to reduce
staff and other similar costs, thereby keeping the stations open and actually
promoting program diversity.69
The final result of the liberalized duopoly rule was a two-tiered
approach: (1) in a market of fifteen or more stations, a single entity could
own up to two FM and two AM stations if their combined audience share
was less than 25%;70 (2) in a market of fourteen or fewer stations, the new
scheme allowed common ownership of up to three stations, only two of
which could be in one service, AM or FM—in addition, no entity could
own more than 50% of the stations within the market (also known as the
“50% rule”).71
The 1996 Act increased the two-tiered market system to a multitiered
system. It also allowed an entity to own more stations in a single market, as
well as more stations in a single service. Table 1 illustrates the results of
the 1996 Act.72 The 50% rule for markets of fourteen stations or less still
applies under the 1996 Act.73

65. Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 2755, paras.
34-37, 70 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 903 (1992) [hereinafter Revision of Radio Rules].
66. Id. para. 7.
67. Wenmouth Williams, Jr., The Impact of Ownership Rules and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 on a Small Radio Market, 5 J. RADIO STUD. 8, 10 (1998).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Howard, supra note 58, at 273.
71. Id. at 274 n.52 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a)(1) (1995)).
72. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(a)-(b)(1), 110 Stat.
56, 111 (1996).
73. Id. § 202(b)(1)(D), 110 Stat. at 110.
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TABLE 1. LIMITS ON OWNERSHIP OF COMMERCIAL STATIONS
Market Size
Maximum Number
Maximum Number of
(Number
of Stations Owned
Stations in a Single Service
of Stations)
by a Single Party
Owned by a Single Party
45 or more
8
5
30-44
7
4
15-29
6
4
14 or less
5
3

2.

Multiple-Station Ownership Nationally

The FCC originally began requiring national ownership limits at
about the same time that it began imposing local ownership limits.74 The
national ownership provisions mandated that a current license holder could
possess a second license only if “the applicant could demonstrate that the
issuance of the license (1) would have a pro-competitive impact, and (2)
would not result in the concentration of control of broadcasting facilities in
a manner inconsistent with the public interest.”75
In 1940, the FCC imposed an absolute limit of six FM stations under
common control.76 National ownership of AM stations, however, went
unregulated until 1946, when the FCC denied CBS an application for an
eighth AM station, thereby imposing a de facto limit of seven AM
stations.77 Significantly, the CBS decision came on the heels of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Associated Press v. United States, which
stated that the First Amendment “rests on the assumption that the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public.”78
Several years later, in 1953, the Commission made official the de
facto seven-station AM limit and raised the FM station limit from six to

74. Television Broadcasting Review, supra note 31, para. 2.
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing Rules Governing Standard and High Frequency Brdcst. Stations, 5 Fed.
Reg. 2382, 2384 (June 26, 1940)).
77. Id. (citing Sherwood B. Brunton, Decision, 11 F.C.C. 407, 3 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 291
(1946)).
The FCC did not impose an absolute limit on AM station ownership as it held
that, with respect to AM, concentration of control “is not a factor of the absolute
number of stations alone but depends also upon the character of the facilities
involved, e.g., the powers and the frequencies of the stations.”
Howard, supra note 58, at 270 n.21 (citing Sherwood B. Brunton, Decision, 11 F.C.C. 407,
413, 3 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 291, 298 (1946)).
78. Howard, supra note 52, at 270 (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1,
20 (1945)).
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seven.79 These new limits were known as the Rule of Seven.80 The rationale
for the Rule of Seven was twofold—“to promote diversification of
ownership in order to maximize diversification of program and service
viewpoints as well as to prevent any undue concentration of economic
power contrary to the public interest.”81
It took the FCC more than three decades to make any significant
changes in national radio station ownership caps, and initial proposals were
drastic. In 1984, the Commission called for a complete elimination of
national ownership caps by 1990.82 The 1984 order stated that because the
duopoly rule was in place, the local market would still be available to
promote viewpoint diversity, and that a wide variety of sources, including
newspapers and cable, were helping individual communities achieve this
diversity.83 The Commission, additionally, maintained that the “Rule of
Seven” was no longer necessary to deal with radio’s scarcity of outlets and
“unique power” to influence and persuade because of the astronomical
increases in the total number of radio stations.84 Moreover, the Commission
directly challenged the idea that group ownership resulted in a “monolithic
editorial viewpoint” and less issue-oriented programming, citing a study in
which the National Association of Broadcasters concluded that there were
bigger news departments and more public service programming on groupowned stations.85 Thus, the Commission actually equated group ownership
with diversity of programming.
In 1985, after receiving eight petitions from the radio industry
requesting that the FCC review the 1984 decision, the FCC decided that
total deregulation was unnecessary and that it would limit ownership to a
modest twelve AM or twelve FM stations nationally.86 Six years later,
79. Further Television Broadcasting Review, supra note 31, at para. 2.
80. Howard, supra note 58, at 271 (citing Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240 and
3.636 of the Rules and Regs. Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and TV Brdcst.
Stations, Report and Order, 18 F.C.C. 288, para. 17, 9 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1563 (1953).
81. Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240, and 3.636 of the Rules and Regs. Relating to
Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and TV Brdcst. Stations, Report and Order, 18 F.C.C. 288,
para. 10, 9 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1563 (1953), cited in Howard, supra note 58, at 271.
82. Howard, supra note 58, at 271 (citing Amendment of Section 73.35555 (formerly
Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636) of the Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership
of AM, FM, and TV Brdcst. Stations, Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, paras. 109-110,
56 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 859 (1984)).
83. Amendment of Section 73.35555 (formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636) of
the Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and TV Brdcst. Stations,
Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, para. 108, 56 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 859 (1984).
84. Id. paras. 7-8.
85. Id. paras. 9, 45-47.
86. Howard, supra note 58, at 271 (citing Amendment of Section 73.35555 (formerly
Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636) of the Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership
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while it was considering loosening the duopoly rules in the face of dismal
radio profits in the late 1980s, the FCC reconsidered national caps yet
again. In 1994, this resulted in a limit of twenty AM and twenty FM
stations.87 With the relaxation of the duopoly and national ownership rules,
as well as the end of the recession of the early 1990s, most of the radio
industry had returned to profitability by the passage of the 1996 Act.88
The 1996 Act performed an about-face on the FCC’s previous efforts
to carefully balance diversity and economics. The Act completely
eliminated any national limits on radio station ownership—a feat that was
not achieved earlier due to industry protest in 1984.89 As in 1984, Congress
cited the public’s access to alternate media outlets (this time including
satellite radio) as well as the increase in the number of radio stations in
operation (which was then at 11,000) to prove that radio ownership was not
in need of national-level regulation.90

3.

The One-to-a-Market Rule

The FCC’s duopoly rule did not prevent an entity from owning both a
television and radio station in the same market. In 1970, however, the
Commission, citing concerns for diversity and competition, adopted the
“one-to-a-market” rule that prevented such ownership arrangements.91 An
increase in broadcasting outlets over twenty years and the realization that
common ownership does not equal common viewpoints led the
Commission to allow waivers of the one-to-a-market rule under certain
conditions.92 The 1996 Act instructed the FCC to extend favored status to
mergers in the top fifty markets, where previously favored status was only
granted to the top twenty-five markets.93 Later, the FCC further relaxed its
one-to-a-market rule to permit a single owner to possess up to two
of AM, FM, and TV Brdcst. Stations, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 74,
para. 53, 57 Rad. Reg.2d 966 (1985)).
87. Id. at 271-72 (citing Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Second Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 7183, para. 5, 76 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 698 (1994)). This
final decision was not without controversy. The FCC initially decided that the limit would
be thirty AM or thirty FM stations; months later, however, the limits were dropped to
eighteen stations for each service, which then increased to twenty by 1994. Id. at 271-72
n.34 (citing Revision of Radio Rules, supra note 59, para. 23; Revision of Radio Rules and
Policies, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7
F.C.C.R. 6387, paras. 10, 70, 71 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 227 (1992)).
88. Bruce E. Drushel, The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Radio Market
Structure, 11 J. MEDIA ECON. 3, 5 (1998).
89. Howard, supra note 58, at 271, 275.
90. Id. at 275 (citing S. REP. NO. 104-23 (1995)).
91. Id. at 274 (citation omitted).
92. Id. (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 276 (citation omitted).
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television stations and six radio stations, depending on how many
“independently owned media ‘voices’” would exist after the transaction.94

III. EFFECTS ON STATION OWNERSHIP
The 1996 Act radically redefined the “marketplace” upon which the
FCC relied to maintain the public interest standard in broadcasting. The
most startling change to the radio marketplace has been an extreme
consolidation of station ownership by larger and larger corporations.95 The
buying and selling of radio stations became a virtual free-for-all after the
passage of the 1996 Act, as approximately $700 million in transactions
took place within the first week after its passage.96 In fact, Radio &
Records’ first issue after the 1996 Act proclaimed, “Let the deals begin!”
and “It’s buy, sell, or get out of the way.”97
Most radio station owners did not simply “get out of the way” of the
1996 Act’s profit-making opportunity. The ensuing months showed an
impressive number of station transactions, many of which decreased, rather
than increased, the overall number of radio station owners. The FCC’s most
recent call for comment on local radio ownership rules noted that at the
time of the 1996 Act’s passage, there were approximately 5,100 owners of
commercial radio stations nationwide; at the end of 2001, there were
approximately 3,800 owners, a decrease of 25%.98 This decrease occurred
even though the total number of stations was at a “robust” 12,932 in June
2001.99 In fact, in March 1996, “an Arbitron metro market had an average
of 13.5 owners; in March 2001, the average was 10.3, a decrease of
22%.”100
The loosening of the local ownership rules only increased the local
consolidation trend that began in the early 1990s with the changes in the
duopoly rule and the rise of “local marketing agreements.”101 However, the
94. Review of the Comm’n’s Regs. Governing TV Brdcst. TV Satellite Stations Review
of Policy and Rules, 66 Fed. Reg. 9039, 9040 (Feb. 6, 2001) (codified at 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.3555 (2001)).
95. See generally Todd Chambers, Losing Owners: Deregulation and Small Radio
Markets, 8 J. RADIO STUD. 292 (2001); Drushel, supra note 88.
96. Todd L. Wirth, Nationwide Format Oligopolies, 8 J. RADIO STUD. 249, 251 (2001)
(citations omitted).
97. Ed Shane, The State of the Industry: Radio’s Shifting Paradigm, 5 J. RADIO STUD. 1,
1 (1998).
98. Rules and Policies Concerning Multiple Ownership of Radio Brdcst. Stations in
Local Mkts., and Definition of Radio Mkts., 66 Fed. Reg. 63,986, 63,990 (FCC Dec. 11,
2001) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73) [hereinafter Multiple Ownership Rules].
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Wirth, supra note 96, at 250 (citing Linwood Hagin, Radio Consolidation:
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national radio market changed dramatically, resulting in a number of
“mega-owners”—owners of national conglomerates of radio stations. Clear
Channel, the originator of the September 11 list, now owns at least 1376
radio stations as a result of transactions mostly completed since the 1996
Act.102 While the number of stations Clear Channel owns is unusually
large, there are other similar, but smaller, radio conglomerates: Infinity
Broadcasting Corp. owns approximately 180 radio stations,103 and Citadel
Communications Corp. at least 205 stations.104
The effect of this consolidation on small market radio ownership has
been particularly acute. One study found that, although the shift from the
trusteeship model to the marketplace model in the early 1980s had a neutral
or positive effect on the number of local owners in metropolitan markets of
125,000 residents or less, the 1996 Act ushered in dramatic ownership
changes for these markets, including a decrease of local.105
Additionally, ownership consolidation has had a sweeping effect on
the ownership of certain radio station formats. A study of fourteen different
radio formats found that ten of the fourteen were at the threshold of
becoming oligopolies based on the ownership concentration of each
format.106 Four companies—Chancellor Media, Clear Channel, Infinity,
and Capstar—own a majority of stations that play some of the nation’s
most popular formats: Top 40, Country, Oldies, and Soft Rock/Lite
Rock/Soft Adult Contemporary/Lite Adult Contemporary.107
Nevertheless, even if the consolidation of owners in a particular
market or format is troublesome, the number of station owners per market
or per station format does not offer an adequate picture of the health of the
radio industry. A recent study by media researcher Bruce Drushel uses
audience share as a measure of market concentration: “Audience share . . .

Applications of National Trends, Paper Presented at 42nd Annual Broadcast Education
Conference (Apr. 4, 1997)).
102. Clear Channel Web site, at http://www.clearchannel.com/ci_oh.php (last visited
Nov. 22, 2002).
103. Infinity Broadcasting Corp.’s Web site, at http://www.infinityradio.com (last visited
Oct. 1, 2002).
104. Press Release, Citadel Communications Corp., Farid Suleman, CEO of Infinity
Broadcasting, Joins Forstmann Little as Special Limited Partner also Named Chief
Executive
Officer
of
Citadel
Communications
(Feb.
20,
2002),
at
http://www.citadelbroadcasting.com/press/pr_full.cfm?press_ID=93.
105. Chambers, supra note 95, at 306-07, 310.
106. See Wirth, supra note 96, at 255. The “traditional thresholds for concern that
concentration is leading to oligopolistic or monopolistic activities that will harm the
economic marketplace have been when the top four firms control more than 50% of a
market.” Id. at 254 (citation omitted).
107. Id. at 255.
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provides a measure of potential revenue, sources of data are readily
available, and the data are comparable market to market.”108 Using
audience share as a measure of ownership power also allows the use of an
important antitrust investigation tool, the Hirschman-Herfindhal Index
(“HHI”), which measures ownership concentration by summing the squares
of the market shares of each of the owners in a given market. An HHI of
less than 1000 is considered unconcentrated, whereas an HHI greater than
1800 is considered heavily concentrated. Drushel studied the HHI for the
top fifty U.S. radio markets from 1992 through 1997. He found these
markets shifted from being unconcentrated (0 to 999) in 1992 to being
moderately concentrated (1000 to 1799) in 1997.109 This data only includes
concentration occurring after the 1992 relaxing of the duopoly rule; it does
not yet include adequate data regarding changes resulting from the 1996
Act’s further deregulation of national and local ownership.

IV. ANALYSIS
The FCC has stated numerous times that its regulations should be
guided by two goals: diversity and competition.110 It is then appropriate to
use the FCC’s diversity and competition framework to assess whether the
current move toward ownership consolidation caused by the 1996 Act is
meeting the FCC’s goals.

A.

Diversity Analysis

The FCC’s diversity analysis focuses on three types: viewpoint,
outlet, and source.111 Viewpoint diversity is concerned with whether “the
media reflect a wide range of diverse and antagonistic opinions and
interpretations.”112 Outlet diversity assures that “a variety of delivery
services (e.g., broadcast stations, newspapers, cable and DBS [direct
broadcast satellite]) [are offering] . . . programming directly to the
public.113 Source diversity means maintaining a variety of producers and
owners of information and programming sources—essentially, it is

108. Drushel, supra note 88, at 10.
109. Id. at 13.
110. Brdcst. Servs.; Radio Stations, TV Stations, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,333, 43,334 (FCC July
13, 2000) (biennial review of broadcast ownership rules). See also Brdcst. Servs.; Radio
Stations, TV Stations, 63 Fed. Reg. 15,353, 15,354 (FCC Mar. 31, 1998) (soliciting
comment for review of broadcast ownership rules) [hereinafter Review of Rules]; Brdcst.
Servs.; TV Stations, 60 Fed. Reg. 6490, 6494 (FCC Feb. 2, 1995) (further notice of
proposed rulemaking).
111. Review of Rules, supra note 110, at 15,354.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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ownership diversity.114 While outlet diversity stayed the same or improved
since the 1996 Act,115 and source (ownership) diversity has clearly
decreased in that same period,116 the question remains whether the decrease
in source diversity has negatively affected viewpoint diversity in either
radio, entertainment, or news content.
For much of the FCC’s history, viewpoint diversity and source
diversity were considered the same, particularly source diversity within one
market.117 This assumption rests on traditional market principles—the more
providers of a service, the more diversity of products and the lower the
price (or in this case, because the radio “consumer” pays nothing, lower
advertising costs). However, some skeptics of this approach offer a
different picture of the radio market, at least for entertainment
programming. They theorize that source consolidation within the local
market results in more niche programming because a provider will avoid
competing against itself. For instance, an owner of five radio stations in the
same community would operate the stations as five different formats
(country, rock, talk, sports, and oldies, for example) in order to attract five
distinct audiences, and thus control a larger audience share overall.118
114. Id. at 15,354-55.
115. Multiple Ownership Rules, supra note 98, at 63,990. The Commission, calling the
current media marketplace “robust,” offered the following figures: In 2001, there were
12,932 radio stations; 1678 full-power television stations; 2396 low-power television
stations; 232 Class A TV stations; and 7 national commercial television broadcast networks.
Additionally, in 2000, daily newspaper circulation was 55.8 million; cable television
systems served 67.4% of television households; and 56% of Americans had access to the
Internet from their homes. Id.
116. See Section III infra.
117. See Brdcst. Servs.; Radio Stations, TV Stations, supra note 110, at 43,334
(“Diversity of ownership fosters diversity of viewpoints, and thus advances core First
Amendment principles. As the Supreme Court has said, the First Amendment ‘rests on the
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public . . .’” (Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). See also Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and
73.636 of the Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and TV
Brdcst. Stations, Report and Order, 45 F.C.C. 1476, para. 3, 2 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1588
(1964) (“[T]he greater the diversity of ownership in a particular area, the less chance there is
that a single person or group can have an inordinate effect, in a political, editorial, or similar
programming sense, on public opinion at the regional level.”); Amendment of Sections
73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of
Standard, FM, and TV Brdcst. Stations, Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, para. 99, 32
Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 954 (1975) (“Early in its history, the Commission acted to adopt rules
to end common ownership of stations in the same service serving substantially the same
area. Needless to say, such commonly owned stations could neither be true competitors nor
could they offer true diversity.”).
118. Drushel, supra note 88, at 8. See also Williams, supra note 67, at 10 (“Diversity of
programming should result because the radio industry is still dependent on niche
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The results of studies of whether source consolidation increases
viewpoint diversity through niche radio formats are mixed. Drushel’s 1998
study of the top fifty radio markets suggests that the number of niche
formats has increased slightly from 1992 to 1997, and the results are
statistically significant.119 However, Drushel also demonstrated that this
increase was not related to source concentration, and the study was
performed too soon to adequately measure the effects of the 1996 Act.120 In
addition, Todd Chambers’s 2001 study of small markets suggested that
niche formats in those markets are generally unaffected by the 1996 Act’s
deregulation.121 The FCC itself recognizes the danger of relying on niche
radio formats as evidence that deregulation of radio is working. Newly
appointed FCC Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein recently spoke about the
tendency of the radio industry to create niche formats that are different in
name only, not in content.122 Because of the shifting definition of a “niche
format,” any claims of increased viewpoint diversity resulting from niche
formats created by source consolidation would be premature at best without
further study.
Furthermore, the effect of source consolidation on viewpoint diversity
in radio news programming is also mixed. Some studies have theorized that
source consolidation would result in a “corporate” news format in which
radio stations do not maintain their own news wires, while other studies
show that news programming would be unaffected.123 Chambers’s 2001
study found that deregulation has had a negative effect, but not statistically
significant, on radio news outlets in small markets, and has led to a loss of
1.6 radio news wires per year in small markets since 1996.124 Again, the
effects of source consolidation are tentative enough to warrant caution,
rather than wholesale approval, regarding the consolidation that has
occurred since the 1996 Act. Thorough studies of the 1996 Act’s effects on
format and news diversity should be conducted before lauding the 1996 Act
as a complete success, or before the passage of any further legislation that
is likely to result in source consolidation.

programming and localism. If programming diversity results from duopolies, then radio
audiences will benefit from them.”).
119. Drushel, supra note 88, at 14.
120. Id. at 18.
121. Chambers, supra note 95, at 309.
122. FCC Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein, The Last DJ?: Finding a Voice on Media
Ownership, Remarks at the Future of Music Coalition Policy Summit 2003 (Jan. 6, 2003), at
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Adelstein/2003/spjsa301.html.
123. Bates & Chambers, supra note 8, at 26.
124. Chambers, supra note 95, at 308.
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Competition Analysis

The 1996 Act’s push to consolidation has not significantly advanced
competition, the FCC’s other guiding principle. The radio market
traditionally has been “in a state of monopolistic competition, in which
there are many owners of stations that appear similar to advertisers and
audiences.”125 Station owners naturally want to increase their size because
much of a radio station’s costs are fixed, meaning that costs are incurred
whether advertising revenues increases or audiences increase.126 Therefore,
station owners have an incentive to own a number of stations to take
advantage of economies of scale.127 This often forces station owners to
merge with or buy existing local stations because “the number of radio
stations in lucrative markets is fixed.”128 Station owners also have
incentives to expand nationally in order to take advantage of the benefits of
owning several stations in the same format, including savings on format
research and production of playlists and jingles.129
Nonetheless, the economic health of all radio stations is not assured
by ownership consolidation. In the early analysis of the 1996 Act’s effects,
smaller ownership groups became less viable after consolidation.130
Furthermore, the effect of station consolidation on other industries, such as
advertising and music, has been problematic. Under consolidation,
advertisers have fewer sellers from whom to buy access to audiences. The
result is that advertising revenue in the top fifty radio markets is increasing
more quickly than retail sales; additionally, revenue is increasing more
quickly in those markets that are more heavily concentrated.131 Although
national format oligopolies are giving radio conglomerates unique access to
particular types of audiences across the country, which might benefit
advertisers (and in turn allows the stations the ability to manipulate
advertising rates more easily), this may not be much of an advantage when
the majority of advertising earnings (approximately 80%) are derived from
local advertising.132
The music industry has been affected by consolidation as well. Just as
format oligopolies offered advertisers unique access to a particular
125. Drushel, supra note 88, at 6 (citation omitted).
126. Id. at 5.
127. Id. (citation omitted).
128. Id.
129. Wirth, supra note 96, at 251.
130. Drushel, supra note 88, at 16.
131. Id. at 18.
132. Wirth, supra note 96, at 252-53. It is important to note that, for all the advantages of
being able to manipulate advertising rates, specializing in a particular format is a risky
strategy if the format becomes unpopular. Id. at 253.
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audience, so too do oligopolies offer the music industry a way to market
music product to a targeted audience.133 Radio stations then have the
leverage to demand perks such as concert tickets, station performances, and
other promotional exclusives; the savings from these perks can be used for
station giveaways that further enhance a station’s popularity (and hurt its
competitors).134 Vertical integration of radio stations also has touched the
music industry, as some station owners such as Clear Channel now own
many major concert venues for which music industry players must bargain
for entry.135 The power of certain station owners to “make or break” certain
artists has even lead to the revival of the early rock-era practice of
“payola,” with the modification that stations state up front that certain
songs have been “paid for” by record labels anxious to be heard on popular
stations.136 Thus, even if the marketplace model is healthy for certain large
radio corporations, it may be draining the vigor from the advertising and
music industries, which will inevitably harm the radio industry in the long
term.
The perceived negative effects of consolidation on the radio,
advertising, and music industries have not gone unnoticed in the political
spectrum. Wisconsin Senator Russ Feingold has voiced concern over the
power of radio corporations in the context of campaign finance reform. In
Senator Feingold’s opinion, “[T]he elimination of the national radio
ownership caps and relaxation of local ownership caps [has] triggered a
wave of consolidation and caused harm to consumers, artists, concert goers,
local radio station owners and promoters.”137 Feingold’s Competition in
Radio and Concert Industries Act, introduced on June 27, 2002, addresses

133. For an artist’s perspective on the music marketing process, including marketing to
radio stations, see Steven Page, The Barenaked Truth About the Music Biz, THE GLOBE AND
MAIL, Apr. 13, 2002 (on file with Journal).
134. Wirth, supra note 96, at 252.
135. Clear Channel Communications Web site, at http://www.clearchannel.com/
entertainment/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2002).
136. About.com’s Music Industry Glossary, at http://musicians.about.com/library/
glossary/P/bldef-payola.htm?terms=payola (defining payola as “[a] system of bribery
developed in the 1950s through which record labels increased airplay of their artists by
paying radio station managers and program directors”). See generally David E. Thigpen, Is
That a Song or a Sales Pitch?, TIME, Aug. 3, 1998, at 73. There are, however, indications
that record companies are becoming unwilling to pay what radio stations are demanding.
Eric Boehlert, The “Bootylicious” Gambit, SALON.COM, June 5, 2001, at
http://archive.salon.com/ent/feature/2001/06/05/sony_payola/.
137. Senator Russ Feingold, Statement on Market Concentration in the Radio, Concert,
and Promotion Industries (June 13, 2002), at http://feingold.senate.gov/~feingold/
speeches/02/06/2002613529.html.
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practices such as payola and multiple ownership of radio stations within a
local market.138

V. CONCLUSION
The FCC’s submission to the marketplace model of radio regulation
twenty years ago did not erase its public interest mandate, or its
commitment to diversity and competition. Yet, the FCC’s deregulatory zeal
in the name of the marketplace model, coupled with the passage of the
1996 Act, has resulted in massive station ownership consolidation that has
not clearly advanced the public interest, diversity, or competition—in fact,
the results are mixed at best, or negative at worst. Because consolidation
continues to increase since the passage of the 1996 Act, more research
should be done into its effects on diversity and competition before the FCC
advocates any further deregulation. Moreover, the FCC should consider
ownership consolidation’s effects on other industries—including the
advertising and music industries—before concluding that any positive
economic effects of consolidation for radio stations are sufficient to
condone consolidation as economically healthy.
Fortunately, the FCC is doing just that. In October 2001, FCC
Chairman Michael Powell formed a Media Ownership Working Group to
strengthen the “factual foundation” of the FCC’s media regulatory
policies.139 As a part of this fact-finding mission, the FCC released several
studies in October 2002. These studies found:
• An increase in both media outlets (television, radio,
newspapers, cable, and DBS) and media owners since 1960;

138. Press Release, Senator Russ Feingold, Feingold Introduces “Competition in Radio
and Concert Industries Act” (June 27, 2002), at http://feingold.senate.gov/~feingold/
releases/02/06/062702medcon.html (currently pending in the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, where it was referred in June 2002).
139. Press Release, FCC, FCC Chairman Michael Powell Announces Creation of Media
Ownership Working Group (Oct. 29, 2001), at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Miscellaneous/
News_Releases/2001/nrmc0124.html. Chairman Powell noted the shaky factual foundation
of current regulations:
For too long, the Commission has made sweeping media policy decisions without
a contemporaneous picture of the media market. We need to rigorously examine
whether current forms of media regulation are achieving the Commission’s policy
objectives, and how changes in regulations would affect the policy goals of
competition, diversity, and localism.
Id. The FCC also scheduled a February 2003 hearing on the issue of media ownership to
supplement the information it was gaining from the studies. Press Release, FCC, FCC
Chairman Michael Powell Announces Public Hearing in Richmond, Va. on Media
Ownership (Dec. 4, 2002), at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC229209A1.doc.
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•

A decrease in the average number of radio stations per market
from 1996 (13.5) to 2002 (9.9);
• No statistically significant change in the number of formats
per market;
• An increase in the advertising share of the largest station
owners per market (35.6% of advertising revenue in 1996 to
46.8% in 2002);
• No relationship between advertising rates and national radio
station concentration per owner.140
Additionally, although its fact-finding mission is laudable, the FCC is
also beginning to realize that bare economics and carefully worded studies
are not enough to encompass the current market’s dearth of quality
programming. As Commissioner Adelstein remarked:
What becomes clear in reading these studies is that we cannot measure
the effect of radio consolidation simply by calculating advertising
revenues or the number of formats. Ownership consolidation in local
markets by definition reduces competition and puts programming
decisions into the hands of comparatively fewer, often national,
players. Therefore, we must consider how consolidation affects the
programming choices available to listeners and the level of local public
affairs coverage.141

Though a return to the trusteeship model of strict content regulation
and small ownership caps may be premature, it is clear that the pendulum
of deregulation has swung far too wide in the wrong direction. The FCC
must continue to commit itself to studying the radio marketplace, both its
economics and programming. This will almost certainly result in the
reconsideration of the present marketplace free-for-all.

140. Press Release, FCC, FCC Releases Twelve Studies on Current Media Marketplace
(Oct. 1, 2002), at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226838A1.doc.
Other recent studies confirm the consolidation trend noted in the FCC studies, but conclude
that consolidation itself is inherently negative. Todd Shields, Music Coalition Reports Less
Variety in Radio, MEDIAWEEK.COM (Nov. 18, 2002), at http://www.mediaweek.com/
mediaweek/headlines/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1763301.
141. Adelstein, supra note 122, at 5.

